Data analytics in a privacy-concerned world by Wieringa, Jaap et al.
 
 
 University of Groningen
Data analytics in a privacy-concerned world
Wieringa, Jaap; Kannan, P. K.; Ma, Xiao; Reutterer, Thomas; Risselada, Hans; Skiera, Bernd
Published in:
Journal of Business Research
DOI:
10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.05.005
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2021
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Wieringa, J., Kannan, P. K., Ma, X., Reutterer, T., Risselada, H., & Skiera, B. (Accepted/In press). Data
analytics in a privacy-concerned world. Journal of Business Research, 122, 915-925.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.05.005
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 26-12-2020
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Business Research
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jbusres
Data analytics in a privacy-concerned world
Jaap Wieringaa,⁎, P.K. Kannanb, Xiao Mac, Thomas Reuttererd, Hans Risseladaa, Bernd Skierae
a Department of Marketing, University of Groningen, the Netherlands
bDepartment of Marketing, Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, United States of America
cWarwick Manufacturing Group, University of Warwick, United Kingdom
dDepartment of Marketing, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria
e Department of Marketing, Faculty of Business and Economics, Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany
A B S T R A C T
Data is considered the new oil of the economy, but privacy concerns limit their use, leading to a widespread sense that data analytics and privacy are contradictory.
Yet such a view is too narrow, because firms can implement a wide range of methods that satisfy different degrees of privacy and still enable them to leverage varied
data analytics methods. Therefore, the current study specifies different functions related to data analytics and privacy (i.e., data collection, storage, verification,
analytics, and dissemination of insights), compares how these functions might be performed at different levels (consumer, intermediary, and firm), outlines how well
different analytics methods address consumer privacy, and draws several conclusions, along with future research directions.
1. Introduction
Digital data–rich environments provide researchers and decision
makers with unique opportunities for obtaining detailed, timely, mul-
tifaceted insights into customers' behaviors and opinions. These vast
data, often called “big data,” primarily can be characterized by their
high volume, high velocity, and high variety (3Vs; Chintagunta,
Hanssens, & Hauser, 2016). The sheer volume and level of detail of
these data allow for unprecedented granularity in customer analyses;
their velocity provides real-time insights; and the access to varied,
previously unavailable or unexplored data sources provides new in-
sights into the needs and wants of customers. These appealing elements
in turn have increased the attention devoted to data analytics, in both
academia and practice (Erevelles, Fukawa, & Swayne, 2016). Yet along
with these promising potential benefits, data privacy issues have come
to the fore, as signaled by the passage of the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) in the European Union, requiring firms to adapt
their data-related procedures to stricter privacy regulations. The United
States does not currently have similar legislation—and at the state level,
only California has passed a privacy act, set to go into effect in
2020—but increased awareness of privacy concerns has prompted self-
policing by many firms (Wedel & Kannan, 2016).
These combined trends in turn raise questions about the role and
value of data analytics in a privacy-concerned society (Sivarajah,
Kamal, Irani, & Weerakkody, 2017). Consumers and society could
benefit from data-driven insights, but their privacy must be protected
too. Although both these opposing forces have effects, the business
press tends to focus on one side, whether stressing the potential of big
data or warning about privacy concerns. Academic research has yet to
detail the implications either. Therefore, with this study, we seek to
gain insights into the best ways to conduct data analytics in a privacy-
concerned world. We start by defining privacy and discuss the main
privacy concerns of consumers. After that, we list and compare different
functions related to data analytics and privacy (i.e., data collection,
storage, verification, analytics, and dissemination of insights). Then we
discuss how these functions might be performed at different levels
(consumer, intermediary, firm). Finally, we outline how well different
analytics methods address consumers' privacy. By combining these as-
sessments, we draw several implications and conclusions, as well as
directions for further research. In particular, we show that firms can
implement various methods to collect, store, verify, and analyze big
data while satisfying privacy needs and thus benefit from the in-
formation available. Even in the face of increasing privacy concerns,
data analytics should be among the core capabilities that organizations
pursue.
2. Privacy concerns of consumers
As Smith, Dinev, and Xu (2011) caution, no single concept of
privacy exists, so we specify that for this study, privacy refers to in-
formation privacy, or access to individually identifiable personal data.
This definition aligns with Westin's (1967, p. 7), in which privacy is
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T
“the claim of individuals … to determine for themselves when, how,
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.”
Information privacy protections seek to ensure personal data can be
accessed only by those with the authorization to do so. The GDPR
(Article 4) defines personal data as “any information relating to an
identified or identifiable natural person,” and further specifies that “an
identifiable natural person is a person who can be identified, directly or
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an
identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or
more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental,
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.” To prevent
illegal, unauthorized uses of personal data, the GDPR requires specific
efforts by firms and outlines consumers' rights over their personal data.
This legislative act accordingly tries to address consumers' privacy
concerns, which have emerged in response to the expanded data col-
lection that takes place in digitalized, individualized markets. Privacy
concerns reflect consumers' attitudes toward and concerns about the
disclosure and processing of personal data (Malhotra, Kim, & Agarwal,
2004). They depend on the person disclosing the data, the context and
setting of the data disclosure, and individual perceptions of the firm
collecting the data (Bansal, Zahedi, & Gefen, 2016; Bergström, 2015).
Martin and Murphy (2017) provide an excellent review of the earlier
empirical findings and theoretical underpinnings on the role of privacy
in the vast privacy research literature.
Beke, Eggers, and Verhoef (2018) and Bansal et al. (2016) both offer
frameworks to link firms' privacy practices to consumers' privacy per-
ceptions and concerns, which determine those consumers' behaviors
and intentions to disclose. The decision to disclose personal data results
from consumers' considerations of both negative and positive potential
outcomes. For example, disclosing personal data could benefit con-
sumers by increasing their access to personalized, potentially enhanced
services that otherwise would be costly to obtain. Yet as Trepte and
Reinecke (2011) outline, the negative consequences of disclosures in-
clude risks of unauthorized access, whether due to data breaches or
unauthorized data sharing with other firms, unknown to the consumer,
that could lead to identity theft or other data abuses (Martin, Borah, &
Palmatier, 2016). The trade-off of these consequences implies a privacy
calculus, such that consumers tend to share personal data with firms if
the benefits outweigh the risks (Dinev & Hart, 2006). This privacy
calculus also depends on the type of disclosed information and the ways
personal data are collected, stored, and used (Beke, Eggers, Verhoef, &
Wieringa, 2018).
If privacy concerns about a firm or a specific personal data dis-
closure episode lead consumers to refuse to share their data, getting
consent to collect personal data becomes very challenging, compared
with such efforts in relation to consumers with fewer or no privacy
concerns. Yet GDPR demands that firms obtain consumers' consent,
such that privacy concerns have direct effects on firms' ability to collect,
process, and analyze personal data. Such data analytics have become
critical to firms' service delivery though, especially in their attempts to
optimize and personalize customer experiences by anticipating and
satisfying their needs. As Beke, Eggers, and Verhoef (2018) suggest and
the GDPR now requires, firms should provide consumers with trans-
parent explanations about the data they collect and how they use them,
as well as grant consumers some control over the disclosure. In turn,
consumers can make more informed decisions about whether to share
information, thereby affecting the amount of data disclosed, according
to whether a firm provides a detailed explanation or not. Beyond this
basic consideration, firms can mitigate privacy concerns and increase
data disclosures by adopting different approaches to their data pro-
cessing activities, as we discuss next.
3. Responsibilities for personal data and analytics
The generation and use of personal data, as is required for efficient
interactions between consumers and firms, consists of several steps and
processes. We identify five main steps: data collection, data verification,
data storage and control, deriving insights, and disseminating insights.
The responsibility for each of these steps might be assigned to or
claimed by different parties in consumer–firm interactions.
Accordingly, we distinguish three levels that might take responsibility
for implementing each step: consumer-level, intermediate-level, and
firm-level actors. Fig. 1 summarizes the two dimensions that we employ
to structure this discussion, that is, the type of personal data responsi-
bility and the level to which each responsibility is assigned.
3.1. Five types of personal data responsibilities
Our grouping of personal data responsibilities reflects the GDPR,
which distinguishes controller and processor roles for dealing with
personal data, as defined in its Article 4:
• A controller is “the natural or legal person, public authority, agency
or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the
purposes and means of the processing of personal data.”
• A processor is “a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or
other body which processes personal data on behalf of the con-
troller.”
Strong, Lee, and Wang (1997) propose a similar categorization but
identify a separate role of data generation in data manufacturing sys-
tems. They thus specify three labels: data producers (people, groups, or
other sources that generate data), data custodians (people who provide
and manage computing resources to store and process data), and data
consumers (people or groups that use data). Each role takes several
tasks, such that data producers engage in data production processes;
data custodians are linked to data storage, maintenance, and security;
and data consumers adopt utilization processes, which may involve
data aggregation or integration. Rather than focusing on these roles, we
group the corresponding tasks and processes into five personal data
Fig. 1. Central study dimensions.
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responsibilities in Fig. 1.
Data collection is the first personal data responsibility; it relates
clearly to a data producer role, in that it involves the generation of
personal data. As the first step in the chain of data processing steps, this
responsibility offers unique opportunities for implementing privacy
measures early in the process, which can ensure “privacy by design”
(GDPR, Article 25). According to the GDPR, data collection is a re-
sponsibility of the processor.
The second responsibility is data verification, which is the first
principle of data processing in the GDPR. Article 5-1a requires personal
data to be processed lawfully, fairly, and in a transparent manner re-
lative to the data subject. This requirement also is expounded in Recital
71 of the GDPR, which mandates that inaccuracies in personal data
must be corrected and that the risk of error is minimized. Data ver-
ification is strongly linked to the data producer role but also might be
important for data custodians or consumers. In the GDPR, data ver-
ification is the shared responsibility of the processor and the controller.
As the third responsibility, we distinguish data storage and control,
strongly tied to the data custodian (Strong et al., 1997) and controller
roles (GDPR). It involves a broad range of tasks, including organization,
structuring, storage, disclosure by transmission, dissemination, restric-
tion, erasure, and destruction of personal data.
Analyzing data to obtain insights is a fourth responsibility. In many
cases that require insights from personal data, the raw data likely need
to be processed to generate the desired insights. Processing may involve
very simple operations, such as summing or averaging, or it could en-
compass extensive econometric modeling efforts. This responsibility
relates to the processor and data user roles.
Finally, the fifth responsibility that we identify is disseminating
insights. It represents the final stage associated with the use of personal
data, in which these data or the insights they provide get communicated
to other stakeholders. From a privacy perspective, this responsibility is
especially crucial, because it explicitly involves sharing information
with different parties. In a privacy-concerned world, this fifth respon-
sibility links closely to the first responsibility. For example, the GDPR
closes the loop by allowing data collection only for specific purposes.
Before collecting any data, firms must consider which insights they seek
to generate and disseminate later. This responsibility therefore corre-
sponds to the GDPR processor role or to Strong et al.'s (1997) data user
role.
To illustrate these responsibilities, consider the task of determining
a credit rating for a consumer who wants to apply for a new credit card.
To avoid privacy issues, the five personal data responsibilities need to
be arranged properly. The collection of customer-level financial data
provides the input for determining the credit rating. To ensure a proper
approval decision, the second responsibility is to verify the trust-
worthiness of these data. Because of the sensitive nature of financial
data, secure storage and restricted access must be applied as the third
responsibility, involving both the consumer and the credit card firm.
Subsequently, the fourth responsibility is to determine the credit rating,
an insight derived from the available data. Finally, the insight gets
shared with (other) relevant players in the interaction, to support an
informed approval decision.
3.2. Three implementation levels
These five personal data responsibilities can be delegated to either
party involved in a personal data exchange. In the credit rating ex-
ample, it may be the consumer's responsibility to collect and provide
data such as an income statement and overview of outstanding debts (in
addition to other data that will be collected by the firm), and the firm
may take primary responsibility for the other four data responsibilities.
This situation is relatively common, in that the majority of personal
data responsibilities tend to be implemented at the firm level, but this
situation is changing. In a digitally connected world, technological
advances empower consumers to produce and consume information
and insights (Van Bruggen, 2018) and take active control over the
network that connects consumers and suppliers (Wuyts, 2010). Such
empowerment benefits consumers and can improve business results
(Wright, Newman, & Dennis, 2006).
Customers and firms are two obvious parties to the exchange that
take on the five personal data responsibilities. However, considering
only this dyad represents an overly narrow view. Multiple actors in-
fluence consumer–firm data exchanges (Henderson & Palmatier, 2010),
so we identify a third level that can operate as an intermediary and
handles one or more personal data responsibilities. In the credit rating
example, third parties such as Equifax offer credit verification services
that can facilitate all five data responsibilities. The intermediary role
thus can be fulfilled by firms, as well as other trusted third parties, such
as agencies or online public communities (e.g., blockchain community).
These intermediaries might start out as “first-party” data processors,
such that they collect and derive insights from data that they obtain
directly from their customers, then transform into intermediaries when
they release personal data or insights to other parties. Another type, so-
called data brokers, only collect personal data from other firms, not
directly from consumers. They produce insights by combining personal
data across multiple sources, then disseminate those insights.
With regard to this latter group of intermediaries, consumers may
benefit from data broker practices, such as if they help shoppers find
products and services they prefer, but their practices have come under
scrutiny, due to associated privacy concerns. The U.S. Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) recently investigated nine data brokers, representing
a cross-section of the industry, and concluded that they obtain and
share vast amounts of consumer information, in some cases behind the
scenes and largely without consumers' knowledge (Federal Trade
Commission, 2014). Furthermore, the FTC report notes that personal
data often pass through multiple layers of data brokers who share data
for unspecified or unanticipated uses. For example, using a customer's
data to identify her as a “Biker Enthusiast” could be a meaningful in-
sight for targeted offers or discounts on motorcycles, but it also could
signal a higher risk category to a potential insurance provider. Other
privacy concerns arise from unnecessary and indefinite data storage;
the FTC report notes the limited extent to which data brokers currently
offer consumers choices about their data, most of which are invisible
and incomplete.
Including intermediaries as a separate implementation level also
can be justified by the size of this industry and the amount of personal
data they process. An estimated 4000 data brokering companies operate
worldwide (World Privacy Forum, 2013). Acxiom, one of the largest,
has 23,000 servers collecting and analyzing data about 700 million
consumers worldwide, with up to 5000 data points per person (Singer,
2012; Wolfie, 2017). Personal data now account for 36% of data-bro-
kering activities globally, both legal and illegal (Transparency Market
Research, 2017).
Furthermore, intermediaries have fundamentally different privacy
incentives, relative to consumers or first-party data processors. That is,
their primary interest is the resale value of personal data and associated
consumer insights, so they have no natural motivation to restrict any
collation or analysis of personal data. Instead, they are limited mainly
by legislation being developed to mitigate adverse consequences for
consumers. In Europe, data brokers are closely regulated by the GDPR;
federal regulation attempts have thus far been less successful in the
United States. For example, the Data Broker Accountability and Trust
Act, which would require data brokers to establish procedures to ensure
the accuracy of collected personal information, has been introduced to
Congress twice but never passed (Data Accountability and Trust Act,
2011). On the state level, the varied efforts exhibit distinct levels of
stringency and success (e.g., General Assembly of the State of Vermont,
2018; South Carolina General Assembly, 2018).
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3.3. Current implementations of data responsibilities
Table 1 illustrates the current implementation levels of the five re-
sponsibilities; more plus (minus) signs in a cell indicate that, in general,
the level in that column takes a stronger (weaker) role in ensuring the
personal data responsibility associated with that row.
This evaluation is strongly context dependent; the distribution of
responsibilities in Table 1 does not hold for all countries or industries or
all types of data. However, the overall conclusions that can be drawn
from Table 1 offer some valuable insights; in particular, it indicates that
firms currently handle most personal data responsibilities, especially
after data collection. They may outsource these duties to intermediaries
to some extent, but customers typically engage only in data collection
and data verification. Consumers' roles for data storage and control, as
well as in deriving insights, are typically minor. They might be some-
what stronger for disseminating insights though, if consumers share the
raw data.
4. Comparison of implementation levels for personal data
responsibilities
In this section, we discuss, for each personal data responsibility, the
advantages and disadvantages of each possible implementation level.
We also seek to identify key changes in the importance of their roles
across responsibilities that currently or are likely to take place. Based
on these predicted changes, we identify several research areas. For each
responsibility, we describe solutions, open questions, and guidelines for
practical applications.
4.1. Data collection
In a digital world, with interconnected customers and complex,
multifaceted interactions with firms, data collection is not limited to a
simple process of gathering potentially relevant information; it en-
compasses the permanent integration of multiple data sources in data
warehouses and the management of their links. For example, both on-
line and offline service providers accumulate vast customer and user
data automatically, from distributed digital systems (e.g., social media,
bookings, online review platforms), which can readily be combined.
Thus, data collection in a digital, data-rich environment is an ongoing
process that ends with data provision, requiring further storage or
processing. In such an environment, the risk of damage to brand value
(e.g., Facebook and Cambridge Analytica case) and customer trust are
legitimate reasons to increase personal data protections.
The corresponding responsibilities traditionally accrue to the firm
or data intermediary, which likely uses one of several data anonymi-
zation techniques, as we detail here. The ideal methodology to protect
sensitive data would ensure that the data cannot be traced back to
Table 1
Current implementation levels of personal data responsibilities.
Personal data responsibilities Implementation level
Customer Intermediary Firm
1. Data collection + + ++
2. Data verification +/− + +++
3. Data storage and control − + +++
4. Deriving insights – – ++ +++





Fig. 2. Trade-off between data utility and protection level for two cases.
(Source: www.mostly.ai).
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individuals but still retain most of its utility or commercial value. The
trade-off of risk and returns ultimately depends on the technique used
for data anonymization (Schneider, Jagpal, Gupta, Li, & Yu, 2018).
The GDPR regulations do not specify processes for anonymization,
but the outcome must be irreversible. Thus, pseudonymization is not an
eligible technique that can comply with GDPR data protection stan-
dards. It consists of removing or hashing personally identifying in-
formation (e.g., name, email, social security number; Fig. 2) from a data
set. As such, it merely reduces the direct link of a data set to the original
identity of a data subject and, though it might offer a security measure,
cannot be qualified as effective anonymization. Examples of pseudo-
nymized data include social network ties (Narayanan & Shmatikov,
2009), location data points (De Montjoye, Hidalgo, Verleysen, &
Blondel, 2013), or combinations of simple demographics (Sweeney,
2000) that allow for the re-identification of individual users.
Privacy concerns related to so-called first-party data, such as cus-
tomer characteristics and purchase histories collected by customer re-
lationship management systems, are relatively “controllable,” from
both customer and firm perspectives. Recently emerging decentralized
technologies give consumers (in their roles as data owners) more con-
trol over whether and how their data may be used. For example, the
transparency offered by blockchain's ledger-based technology might
help mitigate consumers' concerns about how their data are being
processed by marketers and advertisers (Ghose, 2018). Cloud-based
services like the personal data micro-servers offered by the Hub of All
Things (Section 4.3) also offer opportunities to shift control over per-
sonal data back to individual customers.
Privacy concerns gain even more relevance if the firm supplements
data it collected from customers with data from another partner, such
as media providers, social networks, or marketing research companies.
Such secondary party data represent the proverbial ‘new oil’ of our
increasingly digitalized economy. It enriches the firm's own customer
database (and thus enhances sophisticated target marketing actions)
and monetizes data collected by external providers. Against this back-
ground, the increase in the commercial value of the data, achieved by
creating synergies among data-sharing parties, comes at a price of
protecting at least some aspects of customers' sensitive data. Thus, the
move from fully identifiable to anonymized personal data can be driven
by privacy costs, which include the risk of damages to the firm's brand
value or customer trust, legal penalties, and costly regulation. We dis-
tinguish non–model-based and model-based approaches for doing so
(Little, 1993; Reiter, 2005; Schneider, Jagpal, Gupta, Li, & Yu, 2017).
4.1.1. Non–model-based approaches to data protection
Some simple techniques rely on generalizing (e.g., aggregating, re-
coding or top-coding attribute values), data swapping (i.e., changing
variable values), suppression of personal identifiers, or some combi-
nation thereof. Another group of non–model-based methods employ
randomization to protect micro-data by adding random noise, applying
permutation techniques to alter values within a data set, or post-ran-
domizing categorical variable labels (e.g., Gouweleeuw, Kooiman,
Willenborg, & De Wolf, 1998). These widely used methods are parti-
cularly popular among governmental or statistical agencies and easily
available in open-source toolkits like ARX (arx.deidentifier.org) or the
R-package sdcMicro (Templ, Kowarik, & Meindl, 2015).
Some non–model-based data alteration techniques can increase data
anonymity considerably. In particular, suppression and generalization
techniques aim for the so-called k-anonymity property; it applies to a
specific data release if an individual subject contained in the release
cannot be distinguished from at least k – 1 other individual also in-
cluded in the release (Samarati, 2001). This property provides some
basic privacy safeguards, but it remains vulnerable to, for example,
homogeneity attacks (Machanavajjhala, Kifer, Gehrke, &
Venkitasubramaniam, 2007), background knowledge, or intersection
attacks (Francis, Eide, & Munz, 2017) when multiple, complementary
data sets are released. Furthermore, k-anonymity typically can be
warranted only for a very limited number of attributes, because the
unique combinations of attribute values grow exponentially with the
number of attributes (i.e., the “curse of dimensionality”).
These approaches also tend to come at the price of a substantial
decrease in data utility, which impairs their commercial value (Duncan,
Keller-McNulty, & Stokes, 2001; Rust, Kannan, & Peng, 2002). For ex-
ample, adding random noise introduces measurement error that stret-
ches marginal distributions and attenuates regression coefficients
(Yancey, Winkler, & Creecy, 2002); top-coding distorts Gini coefficient
estimates (Kennickell & Lane, 2006); and swapping can destroy the
correlations of swapped and non-swapped variables if used too in-
tensively (Drechsler & Reiter, 2010).
The utility–disclosure risk trade-off also can be formalized, ac-
cording to the differential privacy concept (Dwork & Roth, 2014). It
quantifies the marginal impact of including an individual in a data set
on the outcome of a randomized algorithm (e.g., query, summary sta-
tistic). The preceding sanitization approaches typically perform rela-
tively poorly in terms of differential privacy, especially if they apply to
high-dimensional data sets with highly intercorrelated structures
(Narayanan & Shmatikov, 2008). Fig. 2 illustrates this notion for two
simple cases.
Panel a in Fig. 2 represents a concave downward relationship be-
tween privacy protection and utility for low-dimensional data, such as
when the personal identifiers of an individual (here, the Federal Pre-
sident of Austria) are characterized by just a few attributes like name,
date of birth, and residence. With such low-dimensional data, the
privacy gains increase notably simply by suppressing one or two attri-
butes or generalizing some remaining attributes. In addition, the in-
formation loss is only moderate, so the data retain their usefulness for
informing some query or release. This relationship between privacy
gains and information loss changes completely in a case of high-di-
mensional, highly correlated data. Panel b in Fig. 2 illustrates such a
typical case for an image of Barack Obama, represented by a high-di-
mensional arrangement of pixel values. The specific arrangement—or
more formally, the correlational structure—of these pixels give the
image meaning and makes it personally identifiable. To prevent re-
identification of the individual, the image would need to be generalized
(in Fig. 2, by adding noise) to such a level that the result becomes
useless. As this comparison illustrates, simple, non–model-based
methods might be useful for protecting data that are characterized by
just a few attributes, but they need to be replaced by more sophisticated
approaches when the task is to protect more complex, multidimensional
marketing data structures without destroying their commercial utility.
4.1.2. Model-based approaches to data protection
More sophisticated model-based approaches for data protection ty-
pically aim to generate customer-level, “synthetic” data by mimicking
an underlying data-generating process. The synthetic data-generating
“engines” perform multiple imputation and bootstrap procedures to
address missing data (Rubin, 1993), based on either a statistical (e.g.,
Bayesian) model that generate a posterior predictive distribution ac-
cording to some protected, underlying probability distribution of the
original data, or else some advanced machine or a deep learning ap-
proach (for an overview, see Surendra & Mohan, 2017).
Schneider et al. (2017, 2018) provide two recent marketing appli-
cations of such synthetic data generation. In one, they employ a Di-
richlet-multinomial model to generate synthetic count data and thus
protect histograms of market segment sizes with flexible privacy levels.
They apply this model to a segmented customer base from an online
ticket firm. In another application, they propose a Bayesian random
effects model to estimate protected SCAN*PRO market-response func-
tions and illustrate how data providers, such as the market research
company ACNielsen, could use this model to release useful but still
privacy-protected, store-level data to data users. In this model, the data
provider learns which variables collected from stores might disclose
store identities and thus that need to be protected through a
J. Wieringa, et al. Journal of Business Research 122 (2021) 915–925
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transformation into synthetic data, before releasing the data to users.
These contributions are promising starting points for identifying ways
that firms, data processors, and intermediaries can protect privacy-
sensitive data while still preserving their commercial value. However,
both approaches tackle very specific problems, and it remains ques-
tionable if they are flexible enough to deal with more general cases,
such as those characterized by high-dimensional, correlational data.
More flexibility, and thus a broader scope of applications, might
result from data synthetization, which explicitly accounts for the mul-
tivariate interrelationships of high-dimensional data structures.
Promising research in this direction relies on multivariate Gaussian
copulas (e.g., Patki, Wedge, & Veeramachaneni, 2016); another source
is the machine learning community, which benefits from significant
progress in generative deep neural networks. For example, Karras, Aila,
Laine, and Lehtinen (2017) train generative adversarial networks
(GANs), using a set of real celebrity faces, and demonstrate that the
network can generalize the structure and composition of the training
data. After convergence, the network weights generate an arbitrary
number of synthetic images that preserve the main characteristics of the
training data but recompile them in a way that protects the original
entities (i.e., in their case, real celebrities).
Such deep learning architectures also might be able to resolve
complete information losses associated with efforts to protect high-di-
mensional and intercorrelated data (Panel b, Fig. 2). A differentially
private version of a deep learning architecture with convolutional
layers (Abadi et al., 2016), implemented in TensorFlow, as well as a
GAN-based privacy-preserving generative deep learning approach
(Beaulieu-Jones et al., 2018), represent promising attempts in this di-
rection.
In summary, significant progress in recent years provides increasing
protection of the private data collected from customers. Despite inter-
esting, though also vague and debatable, potential opportunities offered
by newly emerging technologies (e.g., blockchain, personal micro-ser-
vers), including options to grant customers complete control over their
personal data, the primary responsibility for implementing privacy
protections remains with firms and intermediaries. Pseudonymization
and simple rule-based methods for data anonymization typically are not
sufficient to protect complex, dynamic, multidimensional marketing
data. Rather, research remains necessary, in particular to develop ad-
vanced model- or machine-learning based approaches that can generate
synthetic, individual-level, high-dimensional data that “mimic” real-
world information.
4.2. Data verification
Before the collected data can undergo further processing, it should
be clear to all stakeholders that the data provided are of such quality
that further processing is useful. Without sufficient data quality, users
may lack confidence in the data (Martin et al., 2008), which can have
financial impacts of up to 15–25% of operating profits (Olson, 2003),
diminish customer confidence and satisfaction, hinder productivity, and
even have serious consequences for risk and compliance (Loshin, 2011).
Data quality relates closely to veracity, sometimes referred to as the
“fourth V” of big data. Veracity implies the trustworthiness and the
accuracy of the data (Mittal, 2013). Regardless of which level is re-
sponsible for collecting data, the other parties must be sufficiently
convinced of the veracity of any data they receive. Yet there are mul-
tiple potential sources of error (Pendyala, 2018), such as:
● Incorrect observations, by humans or sensors. For example, if the
value of a car is needed to determine car insurance fees, this data
point may be inaccurate if humans provide the estimate, because
they are exposed to subjective considerations, such as the emotional
value that an owner attaches to the car or a desire to keep the fees
low. Yet a human estimate is beneficial too, because it can in-
corporate multiple aspects to determine value. A sensor
measurement, such as the number of miles the car has driven, is
more objective but might be insufficient and one-dimensional. Both
types of measurements thus may lead to data inaccuracies.
● Incorrect translation or extraction (e.g., automatic extraction of in-
formation from html). When a data point needs to be copied from
one medium or format to another, the process can induce errors. For
example, digitizing data points on paper using optical character
recognition may produce some incorrect output. Or, if file formats
are not compatible, conversion errors may emerge from transferring
data points from one format to another.
● Incorrect entry, either manually or by sensors. Even if the data
points are correctly observed or extracted, entry errors may occur,
such as due to typos.
An extensive range of interrelated tools can help ensure that col-
lected data are accurate and trustworthy. Maletic and Marcus (2009)
outline a three-step data verification process: (1) define possible types
of error, (2) identify error instances, and (3) correct them. We discuss
several tools and techniques that can be used in each of the steps.
Subsequently, we indicate whether the corresponding data verification
tools should be applied at the customer, the intermediary or the firm
level.
4.2.1. Metadata repositories
Metadata repositories help prevent data inaccuracies by ensuring
that all data elements are named, with a clear definition (Loshin, 2011),
and by accepting only those data elements that fulfill these data defi-
nitions. Thus, they limit the collection of inaccurate data and provide a
means to verify erroneous data elements. The data definitions from
metadata repositories provide a point of reference for the first two steps
in the data verification process but are also important in the third step,
in correcting erroneous data points.
4.2.2. Data profiling
Data profiling relies on analytical methods that review the data to
develop a thorough understanding of their content, structure, and
quality (Olson, 2003). As this definition illustrates, data profiling thus
can serve multiple purposes. For example, it enables inferences of me-
tadata and can identify anomalies, thereby contributing to the first and
second steps of the data verification process, respectively. Loshin
(2011) describes step-by-step, column, table, and cross-table analyses
that identify data issues, and Maletic and Marcus (2009) point to
clustering, pattern detection, and association rules that can recognize
data errors (especially if these errors manifest as outliers).
4.2.3. Data monitoring
Even sophisticated methods for preventing or removing erroneous
data points cannot completely eradicate all data issues, so some level of
data inaccuracy will exist (McGilvray, 2008). Data monitoring provides
a way to manage this uncertainty and identify whether the accuracy
and trustworthiness of the data are sufficiently high to warrant further
processing. With this ongoing error detection, data monitoring strongly
reflects the second step in the data verification process.
Data monitoring tools might be transaction oriented or database
oriented (Olson, 2003). The former identify issues in individual trans-
actions, before data are stored or processed further. The latter peri-
odically inspect stored data to find issues, often using control charts
(Loshin, 2011). Berti-Équille and Borge-Holthoefer (2015) present a
broad overview of methods for truth discovery, fact checking, trust
computation, and detecting misinformation in networked systems. The
preventive nature of transaction-oriented data monitoring might offer
some advantages but processing each transaction can be too slow if it
involves too much checking (Olson, 2003). Transaction-oriented data
monitoring also is less effective than database monitoring, because
problems might not be visible in individual transactions but could
surface through assessments of counts, distributions, or aggregations.
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Thus, data monitoring is most effective if it combines transaction and
database monitoring.
4.2.4. Implementation levels associated with verification of accuracy and
trustworthiness
Reviews of the quality of data being collected might span all three
implementation levels that we identify. If customers are responsible for
data collection, a firm or intermediary that takes on the further pro-
cessing of those data will want to identify any anomalies or erroneous
data points and correct them. If an intermediary or firm is responsible
for collecting data, it should be possible for the customer to check their
veracity. However, the preceding verification tools are not equally well
suited for the three implementation levels. For example, most custo-
mers interact with relatively few firms, which typically require different
types of data exchanges. In addition, customer-level data storage op-
tions for recording transactions with firms are not well developed (as
we discuss in the next section). The basis of comparison that customers
can use to verify data is smaller than the one available to intermediaries
and firms, and consequently, firms and intermediaries are potentially
better equipped to engage in efficient, large-scale data verification
processes than customers. In contrast, customers have better options for
performing detailed verifications of individual data points.
Because firms mostly dictate the types of data that need to be ex-
changed to complete a transaction, the format and the type of data that
customers observe or produce is more heterogeneous than the data
processed by the firm (or intermediary). To avoid proliferations of de-
finitions and names for the data elements, metadata repositories should
not be developed by customers. Either intermediary agencies or firms
should provide the definitions and variable labels, to ensure that the
collected data elements meet standardization criteria and contain ap-
propriate information, such that they are useful for further processing.
Data profiling also may be more efficient at the intermediary and
firm levels than at the customer level. Developing an understanding of
various data aspects generally requires analyses of vast amounts of
data, such as comparing values across many customers. More data
support the use of advanced, potentially more useful types of data
profiling. Customers typically conduct less sophisticated data profiling,
if at all, though this assessment might change if personal data storage
solutions (Section 4.3) become more commonplace.
Regarding the possible implementation levels for data monitoring,
we consider transaction monitoring and database monitoring sepa-
rately. Transaction monitoring is appropriate for all parties involved in
a transaction, even if the focus changes for customers versus inter-
mediaries and firms. Because customers generally are involved in re-
latively few transactions, they are better equipped to monitor transac-
tions in detail. In contrast, firms and intermediaries have better options
to identify problems that surface from counts, distributions, and ag-
gregations of personal data. Database monitoring also is less well suited
for customers than for intermediaries and firms; customers rarely have
access to large-scale databases.
4.3. Data storage and control
As we discussed in Section 3.2, data storage and control responsi-
bilities are strongly linked to the controller role (Article 4, GDPR).
Controllers act as custodians of personal data (Diaz, Tene, & Gürses,
2013) and must be able to demonstrate compliance with the principles
for processing of personal data, according to Article 5 from the GDPR:
lawfulness, fairness and transparency, data minimization, accuracy,
storage limitation and integrity, and confidentiality of personal data.
Baxter, Aurisicchio, and Childs (2015) identify five affordances of
control that jointly affect the level of perceived control and can support
the GDPR principles. First, spatial control is defined an ability to ma-
nipulate objects through space. For intangible, digital, personal data,
this affordance relates to an ability to influence the physical location of
the data servers that contain the personal data (Kamleitner & Mitchell,
2018). Second, configuration control pertains to the manipulation of the
data collection, storage, and processing conditions, such as the ability
to change access rights to data. Third, temporal control can be defined as
the ability to use the data when desired. Fourth, rate control is the power
to adjust the amount of personal data being used. Fifth, transformation
control relates to the ability to alter and process personal data.
The perceived level of control, according to the customer, depends
on which party is responsible—currently, it tends to be the firm.
Personal data collected by firms during transactions, through enabling
devices such as wearables, or from online services such as social media
usually are stored on firms' hardware or software, such that they be-
come firm assets. Firms need to exercise spatial and configuration
control over the infrastructure, for maintenance purposes. Consumers
typically do not possess any legal or commercial power over the in-
frastructure and are not allowed to exercise full spatial or configuration
control. However, the firm can give a consumer some level of control
over data storage, so we define the level of spatial and configuration
control as medium for data stored at the firm level.
Firms also can process and generate insights from these data to
improve their services. For example, supermarkets can customize vou-
chers according to the needs and wants of individual customers, re-
flecting their observed shopping behavior. In addition, firms can cen-
tralize data collected from previously separate silos and combine them
with wider data sets (e.g., weather, traffic) (Ng, Scharf, Pogrebna, &
Maull, 2015). Typically, consumers cannot exercise full control over
these data processing steps either; they might exercise indirect control
through the consent they give to the firm. Therefore, we define the level
of temporal, rate, and transformation control as medium for personal
data stored at the firm level.
In Section 3.2, we specified some privacy risks associated with data
brokers, which store personal data gathered from many resources, often
without consumers' knowledge. In these cases, there is no direct link
between the consumers to whom the personal data belong and the in-
termediary (Boudreaux et al., 2014). Thus, data storage at the inter-
mediary level scores low on all five control affordances, and the
transparency of control remains a major concern. Yet by recognizing
consumers as the owners of their personal data, the GDPR enforces
consumers' right to access to (co-)created personal data (Article 15.3). It
mandates that firms and intermediaries provide copies of personal data
to any requesting consumer, in a commonly used digital format. This
requirement creates a rather disruptive shift of power toward con-
sumers, for two main reasons. First, consumers can function as new,
potentially better aggregators of their personal data, because they may
claim personal data from all firms and intermediaries and centralize
previously disparate data sets across these sources. Second, consumers
gain a digitally processable record of their personal data. In principle,
considering the advances in personal information management systems,
consumers can act more like a firm and store, control, and process their
own personal data, as well as actively participating in personal data
exchanges. For example, on the Hub of All Things (https://
hubofallthings.com), individual users can configure their own per-
sonal data storage infrastructure. Thus, for personal data stored at the
consumer level, the consumer has full control across all five control
affordances.
This discussion of the storage and control of personal data leads us
to conclude that, across the five control affordances, personal data
storage at the consumer level provides superior control to the consumer
and offers individual control by design and by default, as required by
the GDPR. Provided it complies with the GDPR, personal data storage at
the firm level can offer a medium level of privacy and control to con-
sumers. The data brokerage function of intermediaries instead limits
their ability to preserve privacy and control for consumers.
4.4. Deriving insights from data
Kotler and Armstrong (2014, p. 125) define customer insights as
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“fresh understandings of customers and the marketplace derived from
marketing information that become the basis for creating customer
value and relationships.” Thus, an insight is the result of some analysis,
based on data, that goes beyond any individual data point. Deriving
insights from data requires consideration of several interrelated factors,
such as the specific ways the data collection is impacted, the challenges
each situation poses for the firm and its analysis, the different types of
analyses that might overcome these challenges, and the extent to which
insights can be derived from various methodologies. For example, re-
lated to the first factor, government oversight and regulations could
restrict the collection of specific data about potential customers. As a
result, data collection is affected in four ways:
(a) Some individual-level data that were collected previously may not
be legal to collect, so they are no longer be available as input for
any analysis.
(b) In some cases, personally identifiable information may be scrubbed,
leading to anonymization of the data.
(c) Some data may be available only at the aggregate level, such as the
zip-code level rather than the household level.
(d) In some cases, data may be available at the individual customer
level, with permission from the customer using an opt-in me-
chanism.
Such scenarios imply several challenges for deriving insights using
data analytics techniques (Wedel & Kannan, 2016). First, the marketing
analytics techniques need to be able to use minimized (data in a com-
pressed form or subset of original variables) and anonymized data
without losing their predictive and diagnostic power. Second, inter-
mediaries should represent customers' interests in terms of how firms
use their data for targeting and marketing purposes.
Several methods currently available can address these needs and
extend the four specific data collection methods. For many conditions,
Bayesian methods provide possible solutions. For example, if some
variables are missing, assuming models used previously to make pre-
dictions are available, together with sufficient statistics (e.g., means,
variances, cross-products, posterior distributions), they could be used
for Bayesian updating and analysis as new data come in, without losing
any information, even in the absence of the original data (Wedel &
Kannan, 2016).
A good example of an application in this genre is Holtrop, Wieringa,
Gijsenberg, and Verhoef's (2017) prediction of churn at the customer
level, without using past data, based on a general mixture of the
Kalman filters model. Another possible methodology relies on copulas
(Danaher & Smith, 2011) to deal with endogeneity correction (Park &
Gupta, 2012). If joint distributions can be retained, these methods
provide useful inferences about the missing dimensions. Specifically,
the copula provides parameters in a distribution function, similar to a
variance–covariance matrix in the multivariate normal case. With en-
ough observations on a few variables, using the marginal distribution of
the variables along with the copulas, we can construct the missing
values, though not with a view to protect privacy. Bayesian estimation
methods then retain information from the marginal distribution and
copulas from prior data, create estimates for missing values, and update
the information for new data. Copulas have been used for geostatistical
interpolations of unobserved locations, as an alternative to kriging
(Bárdossy & Li, 2008), and they may provide similar insights in a
context of missing data.
When only aggregate data are available, it is generally the case that
aggregation is performed to preserve anonymity. Wedel and Kannan
(2016) describe some examples; Steenburgh, Ainslie, and Engebretson
(2003) fuse data from several sources at different aggregation levels,
using a hierarchical Bayesian model. Musalem, Bradlow, and Raju
(2008) instead use missing data imputation methods to obtain in-
dividual-level insights from aggregate data. Such data augmentation
methods can estimate consumer-level insights from aggregate data in
the context of data minimization, obviating the need for individual-
level data and work with anonymized aggregate data. In a related
context, Jerath, Fader, and Hardie (2016) examine the possibility of
estimating customer-based models using aggregated data summaries
alone, namely, repeated cross-sectional summaries of the transaction
data (e.g., four quarterly histograms). These hybrid models perform as
well as individual-level data in deriving insights into customer beha-
vior, but they also prevent any identification of individual customers.
Another promising source of individual-level insights could be agent-
based modeling techniques (Rand & Rust, 2011), which simulate in-
dividual-level behaviors to align with aggregate-level data.
If instead data are available only for customers who opt in, data
imputation methods can impute values for the missing data for custo-
mers who do not opt in. Some conditions need to be satisfied for such
imputation to work (see Kamakura, Wedel, de Rosa, & Mazzon, 2003).
People who opt in are self-selected customers, which may create en-
dogeneity that requires consideration, if the results serve purposes
other than prediction. Continued work is needed to develop models and
algorithms for obtaining insights from these data while preserving
customers' privacy.
Another challenge for overcoming the data limitations imposed by
privacy regulations to obtain relevant insights is the rise of institutions
that might function as intermediaries between the firm and customers
(see Section 3.2). Such intermediaries take various forms, such as those
detailed by Rust et al. (2002). Their primary task would be to collect
information from customers and provide it, in a usable form, to firms
while anonymizing customers' identities. In some variations, the in-
termediaries retain the identities and target customers on the firm's
behalf. Such activities are similar to the practices of Google, Facebook,
and innumerable display advertisement intermediaries, but a key dif-
ference emerges from the fiduciary role that intermediaries may need to
serve, on behalf of customers. That is, they cannot take advantage of
customers or customers' data for their own profit motives by misusing
their data. Such intermediaries will fall under the strict oversight of
government bodies, similar to financial advisors who advise customers
according to their fiduciary duties.
Such institutions are evolving, though not in the same forms. For
example, the Hub of All Things (see Section 4.3) allows customers to
retain control of their data and provide them to firms after they assess
the benefits of doing so. Such institutions should be encouraged by
governments to protect customers' privacy and harvest data for legit-
imate business purposes, to match products and services with customers
using insights derived from data.
4.5. Disseminating insights
The dissemination of insights is crucial for ensuring the impact of
the analytics, whether within the firm (internally) or across its industry
(externally). For privacy, external dissemination is especially inter-
esting. Conditional on consumers' consent to collecting and analyzing
their data for a specific goal (Sections 4.1 and 4.4), sharing the relevant
insights internally should not violate privacy. Instead, we focus on is-
sues related to external dissemination of insights and thus clearly dis-
tinguish insights from data (see Section 4.4). In turn, we consider three
aspects of the dissemination of insights: who initiates the dissemination
(initiator), who disseminates the insight (disseminator/sender), and to
whom the insight is disseminated (receiver).
4.5.1. Initiator of external dissemination of insights
According to the GDPR, the consumer must be the initiator of in-
sight dissemination in most cases. Consumers give firms permission to
collect data for specific goals only, so firms may not use these data for
any other purpose. By granting consent (i.e., opting in) for data col-
lection for a certain goal, consumers indirectly initiate dissemination of
the insights related to a specific goal to third parties. For example,
telecom customers might opt in to allow the firm to collect calling data,
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enabling it to provide relevant insights for service improvements. The
resulting insights, based on the data of all customers who opt in, will be
disseminated to the net operator or any third party that contributes to
service improvement. Thus, by opting in, the customer initiates the
insight. Exceptions exist, such that firms or intermediaries can initiate
dissemination. For example, the consumer credit rating agency Bureau
Kredietregistratie (BKR) is required by Dutch law to register any loan
previously offered to consumers. Before providing a new loan, organi-
zations can contact BKR and obtain a profile of the consumer applying
for that loan. Although strictly speaking, the consumer initiates the
dissemination by taking the loan in the first place, it is a firm that ac-
tually requests insights from the intermediary.
4.5.2. Disseminators and receivers of insights
The dissemination of insights on the customer level is not common
practice, because customers do not own the insights that firms generate.
For example, a customer's churn probability with a telecom service
operator typically is stored and owned by the telecom firm. As we ar-
gued in Section 4.3 though, we expect that storing data at the customer
level will become increasingly common in the future, such that custo-
mers might give firms access to their data for a limited time and for
specific purposes. For example, a customer might share a purchase
history from online retailer A with online retailer B to support analyses
that lead to the development of relevant personalized offers. In ex-
change for the access to these data, retailer B might provide benefits,
such as extended delivery options. By giving customers control over the
insights generated by their data, the insights become a sort of currency
that customers can decide to exchange for benefits. A key issue though
is the verification of these insights, similar to the data verification issues
discussed in Section 4.2.
Intermediaries are the most likely to disseminate insights externally.
For example, advertising agencies collect vast amounts of data about
consumers who allow tracking of their browsing behavior. Ad agencies
and platforms use insights derived from these data to customize ad-
vertising and optimize ad effectiveness for clients and consumers.
Strictly speaking, the intermediaries do not disseminate the insights but
rather use them to serve clients. This business model is sustainable
under GDPR, as long as consumers are willing to opt in to receive
customization. The trade-off between protecting privacy and benefiting
from customization is the responsibility of the consumer.
Finally, firms are unlikely to disseminate insights externally. Under
GDPR, firms need to be transparent about what data they collect and
what they intend to do with them. Most insights get used internally. As
noted, consumers might give a firm permission to share the insights
with other parties, but instead, they appear increasingly likely to store
insights individually and share them with other parties themselves.
Thus, consumers have full control over their data and insights and
potentially could benefit from them.
5. Conclusions, recommendations, and research agenda
In our effort to determine how best to conduct data analytics in a
privacy-concerned world, we start by identifying five responsibilities
for personal data and analytics (data collection, data verification, data
storage and control, deriving insights, and disseminating insights),
which can be implemented at three levels (customer, intermediary, and
firm). With Section 3, we reveal that most responsibilities are allocated
to the firm level. For each responsibility, we also consider how the
implementation might be shifted to improve consumers' privacy, which
we summarize in Table 2.
In the first row of Table 2 (reflecting Section 4.1), we list all levels
that can take the responsibility for collecting personal data in a privacy-
friendly way. From our observation in Section 4.3 that data storage and
control at the customer level provide superior privacy protection, with
solutions already available, we recommend that this responsibility
moves to the customer level. In contrast, privacy safeguards are
relatively poor at the intermediary level, because intermediaries are not
directly linked to the consumers whose personal data have been col-
lected. Yet intermediaries often constitute a large industry, such as in
advertising, and are ideally positioned to combine data from various
sources, such that they can generate rich, potentially novel insights.
Therefore, they have an influential role in delivering on the promises of
big data, and we advise maintaining their responsibility for deriving
insights, despite the potential privacy issues. As long as effective
privacy legislation gets implemented, firms can safely take on a sizeable
portion of this responsibility too. Noting their relevant role for data
storage and control, consumers also should take on more responsi-
bilities for data verification, deriving insights, and disseminating in-
sights (rows 2, 4, and 5 in Table 2).
Generally, the evidence in Section 4 and Table 2 indicates that in-
creasing the role of customers relative to responsibilities can alleviate
privacy concerns. The focus does not need to shift entirely to customers
though. Firms and, to a lesser extent, intermediaries still should
shoulder an important portion of the responsibilities. Our overview in
Section 4 highlights the available solutions that can facilitate the im-
plementation of each personal data responsibility; these techniques do
not necessarily require a shift from the intermediary or firm level to the
customer level to avoid privacy issues. In turn, firms and intermediaries
can generate customer insights from personal data, while still re-
specting customers' privacy.
Together with this positive overall summary, we identify many
areas that warrant further research. With respect to the data collection
responsibility, we mainly identify methodological opportunities. A
promising area is to develop better approaches for generating synthetic,
individual-level, high-dimensional data that mimic real-world entities.
Specifically, we call for the development of advanced model or machine
learning approaches that are able to generate data that is applicable in a
broader range of marketing applications than previously developed
approaches. In turn, we encourage research that investigates the trade-
off between privacy preservation and information loss, as well as the
development tools that can balance this trade-off. We welcome efforts
to make companies' and public institutions' uses of sensitive data more
transparent (e.g., blockchain, personal data exchange services), to
avoid that outcomes of newly developed approaches are neither un-
derstood, nor accepted by consumers.
Considering that most of the data verification techniques are cur-
rently available only to firms and intermediaries, techniques for large-
scale, real-time data verification and protection need to be developed,
ideally as part of the data collection process. When consumers take on
more personal data responsibilities, they need to be better equipped to
investigate data veracity, given that the type of data that they collect
has fundamentally different characteristics than that of firms and in-
termediaries (see Section 4.2). To this end, the data verification tools
that firms and intermediaries currently employ need to be adapted to
suit the data verification needs of consumers. We thus call for research
on data verification tools on all implementation levels to stimulate that
only relevant and correct data will be stored.
Our discussion in Section 4.3 suggests that customers should be
more involved in data storage and control. Consequently, inter-
mediaries need tools to increase the level of control granted to
Table 2
Current and preferred implementation levels of personal data responsibilities.
Personal data responsibilities Implementation level
Customer Intermediary Firm
1. Data collection +➔++ +➔++ ++➔++
2. Data verification +/−➔++ +➔+ +++➔++
3. Data storage and control –➔+++ +➔+ +++➔++
4. Deriving insights – –➔++ ++➔++ +++➔++
5. Disseminating insights −/+➔++ +➔+ ++➔++
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consumers. In particular, intermediaries should find ways to strengthen
their link with consumers while still protecting their privacy. Currently,
intermediaries directly benefit from consumers' data, whereas con-
sumers generally benefit only on the long run or in an aggregate sense
(e.g., development of a free email service, based on their data). If
consumers retained full control over their data, they might consciously
provide access to only a limited set of intermediaries. In that case,
consumers' personal data would function as currency, and they could
make individual trade-off assessments between protecting their privacy
and obtaining the benefits of sharing some data. We call for research
that attempts to establish valuations of data points, aggregates, or in-
sights. Furthermore, customer empowerment could have substantial
impact on customer–firm or customer–intermediary relationships. We
believe research in such areas would be fruitful.
Expanded customer roles in data storage and control also provide
challenges associated with the responsibility for deriving insights. As
we outline in Section 4.4, firms and intermediaries must be able to
handle customer data that becomes available intermittently. In addi-
tion, customers self-select what data they share, and the endogeneity
issues associated with forward looking behavior of customers in these
data sharing decisions should be carefully taken into account when
deriving insights from these data. We encourage further research into
models that accommodate these issues.
Several open research areas also relate to the personal responsibility
of dissemination. What value do consumers attach to their data? How
much would consumers be willing to pay to keep or gain control over
their data (e.g., in relation to content providers)? How much would
they require firms to pay them to grant access to their data (e.g., online
retailers)? How should firms value their access to consumers' data and
insights? Which incentive schemes are most effective to motivate con-
sumers to share data with intermediaries and firms?
The starting point for this research was the recognition of a con-
ventional wisdom that assumes data analytics and privacy protection
contradict each other. We hope to have shown that such a view is too
narrow, because firms can implement a wide range of methods that
satisfy different degrees of privacy, while still enabling them to address
all data analytics responsibilities.
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